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NOVEL SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE OF
INTOXICATION: ACOUSTIC
ANALYSIS OF VOICE RECORDINGS
FROM THE EXXON VALDEZ
J. Alexander Tanford*, David B. Pisoni** & Keith Johnson***
Author's Notes: Part of this article reports original research conducted
under the direction of the second and third authors. The initial re-
search was supported by a contract to Indiana University from General
Motors Research Laboratories. The specific analyses of voice record-
ings of Captain Joseph Hazelwood were conducted by them at the re-
quest of the National Transportation Safety Board, and are based on
tapes and data supplied by the NTSB. The second author may be
called as a witness in some of the lawsuits pending against the Exxon
Corporation. The opinions expressed in this article concerning
whether this evidence meets the legal standards of reliability and ad-
missibility are those of the first author, who is not affiliated with the
Speech Research Laboratory and has not participated in either the ini-
tial research nor the analysis of the Exxon Valdez tapes.
I. INTRODUCTION
On March 24, 1989, the oil tanker Exxon Valdez ran aground in
Prince William Sound, causing the worst accidental oil spill in his-
tory. Captain Joseph J. Hazelwood was in command of the ship,
although he was not on the bridge at the time of the accident. Al-
most immediately, rumors and allegations surfaced suggesting that
Hazelwood was intoxicated, but no hard evidence came to light. A
captain at sea is a long way from the nearest police officer with a
breathalyzer. Hazelwood denied having been intoxicated, and an
Alaska jury acquitted him of the charge. There seems to be no way
to prove whether or not Hazelwood really had been drinking. Or is
there?
* Professor of Law and Ira C. Batman Fellow, Indiana University - Bloomington.
** Professor of Psychology and Cognitive Science & Director, Speech Research Labo-
ratory, Indiana University - Bloomington.
*** Phonetics Laboratory, Department of Linguistics, University of California at Los
Angeles.
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Recent work in the Speech Research Laboratory at Indiana Uni-
versity's Psychology Department suggests that intoxication can be
detected by acoustic-phonetic analyses of a suspect's voice.' The
National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB), the federal agency
charged with investigating the Exxon Valdez accident, made avail-
able to the authors copies of tape recordings of conversations which
took place between Captain Hazelwood and the Coast Guard from
before, during, and after the accident. 2 Analyses of these tapes sug-
gest that Hazelwood was indeed intoxicated when his ship ran
aground. 3 This novel application of speech science techniques for
measuring the effects of alcohol on speech has never, to the knowl-
edge of the authors, been attempted in a civil or criminal case.
Our analyses raise several obvious questions: Are the results
reliable? How certain can we be that Captain Hazelwood was intoxi-
cated? And, if this new testing procedure, based on voice record-
ings, can indeed determine that someone was under the influence of
alcohol, are the results admissible in court?
The answers to these questions have implications beyond their
obvious application to determining fault in the more than three
hundred pending lawsuits concerning the Alaska oil spill.4 In many
cases, defendants may be far away from the nearest breathalyzer or
may refuse to submit to blood-alcohol tests. In the absence of relia-
ble, objective evidence of whether a defendant had been drinking,
courts must rely on a presumption of guilt based on a defendant's
refusal to take a test,5 admit the speculative opinions of witnesses,
or let the jury guess after listening to tape recordings. 6 If a new
measurement procedure exists that can, at least in some cases, pro-
vide objective indications of a person's physical state or condition,
I David B. Pisoni & Christopher S. Martin, Effects of Alcohol on the Acoustic-Phonetic
Properties of Speech: Perceptual and Acoustic Analysis, 13 ALCOHOLISM: CLINICAL & EXPERI-
MENTAL RES. 577 (1989); Keith Johnson et al., Do Voice Recordings Reveal Whether a Person is
Intoxicated? A Case Study, 47 PHONETICA 215 (1990).
2 Cf. New York Times Co. v. Nat'l Aeronautics and Space Admin., 920 F.2d 1002
(D.C. Cir. 1990) (voice recordings of deceased Challenger crew held within a Freedom
of Information Act exemption; their release could unfairly invade a right of privacy).
3 Captain Hazelwood denies that he was intoxicated. His attorney, Michael G.
Chalos, has called the analytical method discussed here "voodoo stuff." Katherine
Bishop, Leaps of Science Create Quandaries on Evidence, N.Y. TIMES, April 6, 1990, at B6.
4 As of March 13, 1991, over three hundred lawsuits against Exxon were pending
that are not affected by Exxon's settlement with the Environmental Protection Agency.
Keith Schneider, Exxon to Pay $100 Million Fine and Plead Guilty in Valdez Spill, N.Y. TIMES,
March 13, 1991, at Al.
5 See South Dakota v. Neville, 459 U.S. 553, 564 (1983) (approving the admissibility
of a refusal to submit to a blood-alcohol test).
6 See Pennsylvania v. Muniz, 110 S. Ct. 2638, 2642 (1990) (jury heard video and
audio tapes and testimony about field sobriety tests).
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then courts could more reliably convict the guilty and acquit the in-
nocent in cases where no chemical blood test results exist.
In this article, we describe this new testing procedure, using the
analyses performed on Captain Hazelwood's voice as an example.
We then discuss whether the results should be admissible under the
rules governing novel scientific evidence. We conclude that the
kinds of acoustic-phonetic analyses described in this article produce
reliable and relevant evidence that should be admitted when sup-
ported by proper expert testimony. We do not claim that speech
analyses conclusively prove that Captain Hazelwood was intoxicated
when the Exxon Valdez ran aground. Rather, we believe that the
analyses of Hazelwood's voice produce data consistent with intoxi-
cation. They therefore should be admitted into evidence and con-
sidered by the jury along with other relevant information.
II. THE SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE: DETERMINING INTOXICATION FROM
VOICE RECORDINGS
Alcohol is generally considered to be a central nervous system
depressant. Significant blood concentrations of alcohol have been
found to impair coordination, reflexes and nerve transmissions.7
This kind of loss of motor control would seem naturally to affect
speech. Indeed, controlled laboratory studies have demonstrated
that alcohol produces three kinds of changes in speech production:
gross effects, segmental effects and suprasegmental effects. Exam-
ples of each are listed in Table 1.
Gross effects in speech production involve the alteration of en-
tire words. Alcohol impairs a speaker's ability to retrieve words
from memory and utter them in the proper sequence. A speaker
who has consumed alcohol may revise, omit or interject words,
sounds, or phrases.8 One common example of a gross effect is the
reversal of two words in a sentence (a spoonerism), e.g., "work is the
curse of the drinking class."
Segmental effects, on the other hand, involve the misarticula-
tion of specific speech sounds, notably the phonemes /r/, Al, /s/
and /ts/. These mispronunciations are easily detected in spontane-
7 See M.S. Berry & V.W. Pentreath, The Neurophysiology of Alcohol, in
PSYCHOPHARMOCOLOGY OF ALCOHOL 43-72 (1980); Pisoni & Martin, supra note 1, at 577.
8 See Linda C. Sobell & Mark B. Sobell, Effects of Alcohol on the Speech ofAlcoholics, 15J.
SPEECH HEARING RES. 861, 866 (1972); Linda C. Sobell et al., Alcohol-induced Dysfluency in
Nonalcoholics, 34 FOLIA PHONIATRICA 316 (1982). Gross effects may be hard to recognize
in spontaneous speech because the speaker's intended utterance is unknown.
9 GLORIAJ. BORDEN & KATHERINE S. HARRIS, SPEECH SCIENCE PRIMER: PHYSIOLOGY,
ACOUSTICS, AND PERCEPTION OF SPEECH 56 (2d ed. 1984).
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ous speech if one can compare examples of a person's intoxicated
speech to that person's speech while sober. 10 Although some seg-
mental effects may accompany any kind of loss of motor control,"
the substitution of an /sh/ sound for /s/ seems to be unique to loss
of control caused by alcohol. 12
Finally, suprasegmental effects involve changes in the duration,
pitch and amplitude of speech. Intoxicated speakers talk more
slowly, often use a lower mean pitch, and display greater pitch varia-
tion than they do when they are sober.' 3 When these changes in
speaking rate and pitch can be quantified, they are usually the most
salient indication of alcohol impairment. Differences in rate and
pitch of an intoxicated speaker can be measured objectively using
conventional digital signal processing techniques.' 4 The resulting
measurements may then be easily compared to similar measure-
ments made from samples of the speaker's sober speech. 15 Two
other common suprasegmental effects are vowel lengthening 16 and
lengthening of consonants in unstressed syllables. 17
In trying to determine if Captain Hazelwood had consumed al-
cohol, we applied speech analysis techniques to five samples of his
speech culled from audio tapes provided by the NTSB. According
to the NTSB, these recordings were made thirty-three hours before
the accident, one hour before the accident, immediately after the
accident, one hour later, and nine hours after the accident. All
10 See Leland Lester & Royal Skousen, The Phonology of Drunkenness, in PAPERS FROM
THE PARASESSION ON NATURAL PHONOLOGY 233 (Anthony Bruck et al. eds., 1974); F. Tro-
jan & K. Kryspin-Exner, The Decay of Articulation Under the Influence of Alcohol and Paralde-
hyde, 20 FOLIA PHONIATRICA 217 (1968); David B. Pisoni et al., Effects of Alcohol on the
Acoustic-Phonetic Properties of Speech, in ALCOHOL, ACCIDENTS AND INJURIES 131 (Soc'y of
Automotive Engineers, Inc. Technical Paper No. 860361, 1986).
11 For example, common speech errors include consonant reversals ("a two-sen pet"
instead of "a two-pen set") and vowel reversals ("fool the pill" instead of "fill the
pool"). BORDEN & HARRIS, supra note 9, at 57.
12 See Johnson et al., supra note 1, at 219.
13 Pisoni & Martin, supra note 1, at 582-83. Cf. Sobell et al., supra note 8, at 320
(finding no significant effects on fundamental frequency at moderately high levels of
intoxication (0.10%)); Trojan & Kryspin-Exner, supra note 10, at 222 (effects on pitch
varied).
14 Standard operating procedures were used in analyzing Captain Hazelwood's
speech. The voice recordings were low-pass filtered at 9.6 kHz and digitized at a 20-kHz
sampling rate through a 12-bit Analog-to-Digital (A/D) converter. A digital waveform
editor was used with a PDP 11/34 minicomputer to edit all speech samples into separate
digital files. See Pisoni & Martin, supra note 1, at 577-78.
15 See Pisoni & Martin, supra note 1; F. Klingholtz et al., Recognition of Low-LevelAlcohol
Intoxication from Speech Signals, 84J. ACOUSTIC Soc'Y AM. 929 (1988); Sobell et al., supra
note 8.
16 See Pisoni & Martin, supra note 1, at 581.
17 See Lester & Skousen, supra note 10, at 233-34.
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Table 1
Effects of alcohol on speech.
Gross effects Word/phrase/syllable interjection.
Word omission.
Word revision.
Broken suffixes.
Segmental Misarticulation of "r" and "l".
effects
"S" becomes "sh".
Final devoicing, e.g., "iz" -> "is".
Deaffrication, e.g., "church" -> "shursh".
Suprasegmental Reduced speaking rate.
effects
Decreased amplitude.
Mean change in pitch range.
Increase in pitch variability.
taped communications contained the phrase "Exxon Valdez." This
utterance was the focus of our quantitative analyses because it was
the same phrase used several times, and it contained tokens of the
fricative consonant /s/.
We first looked for gross effects. Gross effects usually are diffi-
cult to measure in spontaneous speech, because the listener does
not know what word was intended by the speaker. Nevertheless, we
found several examples of gross errors where the intended word
was obvious, or the speaker himself corrected the mistake. These
are summarized in Table 2.
We also found several segmental errors in Captain Hazelwood's
speech. We paid particular attention to the /s/ sounds in the phrase
"Exxon Valdez." Although Hazelwood pronounced Exxon cor-
rectly the day before the accident, he misarticulated it as "ekshon"
around the time of the accident. This subjective perception was
confirmed by spectral analysis."' Additionally, the recordings made
18 Spectral analysis techniques are commonly used to measure the distribution of
1991]
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Table 2
Summary of Gross Effects Found in NTSB Tape
First word used Revision
1. Exxon Ba... Exxon Valdez
2. Departed Disembarked
3. I We'll
4. Columbia Gla Columbia Bay
near the time of the accident reveal several misarticulations of /
and Al in the words "northerly," "little," "drizzle," and "visibility".
Finally, the authors found several examples of final devoicing, as/z/
in Valdez became an /s! ("valdes"). These findings suggest that at
the time his ship ran aground, Captain Hazelwood was having diffi-
culty with the fine motor control used to produce these sounds.
The findings do not, however, prove that this loss of motor control
was caused by alcohol consumption.
The most salient indication that a loss of motor control is due
to alcohol consumption is the prevalence of suprasegmental effects.
We focused on speaking rate and voice fundamental frequency.' 9
We measured the duration of the speech segments in the phrase
"Exxon Valdez" in each sample, taking the average of at least two
occurrences of the phrase in each time period. The results, summa-
rized in Table 3, show that it took Captain Hazelwood approxi-
mately 50% longer to say the phrase "Exxon Valdez" at the time of
the accident than the day before.
Speech theory predicts that changes in duration will be most
noticeable in vowel segments 20 and unstressed consonant seg-
ments. 2 1 Looking at the /E/ and /on/ in Exxon and the initial /V/
energy at different frequencies as a function of time. The results are often displayed as
speech spectrograms, or "voiceprints," in order to reveal the dynamic time-varying na-
ture of speech. See JAMES L. FLANAGAN, SPEECH ANALYSIS SYNTHESIS AND PERCEPTION
141-63 (2d ed. 1972).
19 Because the communication equipment had automatic gain controls and the dis-
tance between the speaker and the microphone probably varied, we could not measure
changes in the amplitude of the speech.
20 See Pisoni & Martin supra note 1, at 581.
21 See Lester & Skousen, supra note 10.
584 [Vol. 82
EXXON VALDEZ ACOUSTIC ANALYSIS
Table 3
Cumulative Duration of Speech Segments in "Exxon Valdez"
1000
800
Sor
" 600
0
".4
S 400
200
-33 -1 0 +1 +9
Hours from accident
in Valdez, the slowed speech is particularly apparent. These results
are summarized in Table 4.
Finally, we calculated voice fundamental frequency (pitch)
across the phrase "Exxon Valdez." For each of the five relevant
time periods, we measured the pitch of all four vowel sounds in two
productions of "Exxon Valdez", and averaged the eight measure-
ments. Voice pitch was dramatically lower in the samples recorded
around the time of the accident. Variability of fundamental fre-
quency was correspondingly greater in the voice samples taken at
the time of the accident. Lowered pitch and increased variability are
characteristic of alcohol-impaired speech, so this evidence also sug-
gests that Captain Hazelwood had been consuming alcohol at the
time his ship ran aground. These data are summarized in Tables 5
and 6.
The acoustic-phonetic differences found in the speech samples
supplied by the NTSB are consistent with the findings of controlled
laboratory studies on the effects of alcohol on speech. 22 However,
they do not prove that Hazelwood was drunk. In fact, unless other
obvious explanations for the pattern of changes can be discounted,
22 See Klingholtz et al., supra note 15; Lester & Skousen, supra note 10; Pisoni et al.,
supra note 10; Pisoni & Martin, supra note 1; Sobell & Sobell, supra note 8; Sobell et al.,
supra note 8; Trojan & Kryspin-Exner, supra note 10.
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the pattern is not even strong evidence of intoxication. Speech is
affected by the physical state of the speaker, especially when that
state is characterized by stress or fatigue. Measurements made from
tape recordings can be affected by malfunctions or variations in the
recording equipment. In the Hazelwood case, however, these alter-
native explanations can be discounted.
A. THE PHYSICAL STATE OF THE SPEAKER
Joseph Hazelwood would undoubtedly have been under some
psychological stress following the Exxon Valdez accident, and
would logically have become increasingly fatigued as the hours wore
on. However, neither of these two factors appears to explain the
specific changes in his speech found on the tapes.
Stress might be expected to affect Hazelwood's speech immedi-
ately after, one hour after and nine hours after the accident, but it
could hardly have affected his speech one hour before the accident
occurred. Yet, both segmental and suprasegmental effects are just
as robust one hour before the accident as one hour afterwards. In
addition, previous studies on speech production in stressful envi-
ronments show that stress and alcohol affect speech in opposite ways.
Stress causes pitch and speaking rate to increase rather than de-
crease.23 Psychological states similar to stress, such as fear and an-
ger, likewise produce increases in pitch and rate. 24 Alcohol, on the
other hand, causes fundamental frequency (pitch) and speaking
rates to decrease. In Hazelwood's case, both measures decreased.
Fatigue may cause changes in speech production which are sim-
ilar to those caused by intoxication. Surprisingly, speech scientists
have conducted little controlled research on the effects of fatigue on
speech. In the absence of scientific data concerning the effects of
fatigue on speech production, it is reasonable (and conservative) to
assume that fatigue produces effects which are similar to the effects
of intoxication: a general lowering of arousal, slower speaking rate,
and lower voice pitch. It also seems reasonable to assume that a
person's level of fatigue increases over time without sleep.
Given these assumptions, the pattern of phonetic changes seen
in Captain Hazelwood's speech cannot be attributed to simple fa-
23 See Malcolm Brenner & Thomas Shipp, Voice Stress Analysis, in MENTAL STATE EsTi-
MATION 363 (NASA Conf. Pub. #2504, 1988).
24 See JOHN HANSEN, ANALYSIS AND COMPENSATION OF STRESSED AND Noisy SPEECH
WrTH APPLICATION TO ROBUST AUTOMATIC RECOGNITION, (University Microfilms 1988)
(fear, anger); Carl E. Williams and Kenneth N. Stevens, Emotions and Speech: Some Acousti-
cal Correlates, 52 J. ACOUSTICAL SoC'Y AM. 1238, 1248-49 (1972) (anger).
25 See supra, tables 3-6.
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Table 4
Duration of Vowel Sounds and Consonants in
Unstressed Syllables in "Exxon Valdez"
300
200
WE
-4
0
-4
.I
1 00
-33 -1 0 +1 +9 -33 -1 0 +1 +9 -33 -1 0 +1 +9
E in Exxon /on/ in Exxon V in Valdez
tigue. He spoke more slowly and with lower fundamental frequency
at the time of the accident than nine hours later. Indeed, his speech
nine hours after the accident was similar to his speech the day
before. If the changes could be attributed to fatigue, one would ex-
pect that fatigue-induced effects would be greatest nine hours after
the accident, by which time Captain Hazelwood had been deprived
of sleep for twenty-two hours. This expectation was not borne out
by the data.25
B. THE MECHANICAL STATE OF THE RECORDINGS
Measurements of pitch and duration of sounds are sensitive to
fluctuations in the speed of tape recordings. If an audio tape is
played at a slower speed, the voice will sound lower in pitch, and
speech sounds will seem to have taken longer to articulate. These
effects are similar to those caused by alcohol impairment.
To some extent, the risk of erratic tape speeds is reduced as
long as both the control recording (in which the speaker is pre-
sumed sober) and the test recording (in which the state of the
speaker is in question) were recorded and played on the same
1991] 587
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Table 5
Average Pitch of Voice in "Exxon Valdez"
Table 6
Variation in Pitch of Voice in "Exxon Valdez"
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equipment. The test is a comparative one that does not depend on
the true pitch and duration being known. A more reliable control is
to measure some sound other than the suspect's voice that appears
on both tapes. In the Exxon Valdez case, for example, Captain Ha-
zelwood was talking to the same Coast Guard radio operator on the
various tapes. Hazelwood's voice pitch and duration changed while
the radio operator's did not. It is also possible to measure the aver-
age pitch of background noise on two tapes. This was done for the
Valdez tapes. Again, the background noise did not significantly
change, while Hazelwood's voice did. These observations reduce
the likelihood that the effects measured were the result of mechani-
cal problems in the audio tape recording.
C. OTHER FACTORS
Research on environmental and emotional effects on speech
production has demonstrated that other factors also can cause
suprasegmental effects similar to those caused by alcohol. A noisy
environment has been shown to increase the variability of the funda-
mental frequency and to produce slower speech, but speech pro-
duced in a noisy environment tends to have a higher fundamental
frequency rather than lower.26 In another experiment, acceleration
and vibration affected fundamental frequency and duration, but in a
direction opposite to that caused by alcohol. 27 Several studies on
mental workload with high cognitive demands (e.g., airline pilots,
air traffic controllers) indicate that speech affected by the perform-
ance of a cognitively demanding task will display suprasegmental ef-
fects opposite to those observed with alcohol - higher average
frequency and shorter duration.28 Sorrow produces lower average
frequency and slower speech, but seems to cause less rather than
more pitch variability.29
In short, there are no known environmental situations or emo-
tional states that produce quite the same pattern of suprasegmental
effects as alcohol impairment. These observations mean that, in the-
ory, it is possible to classify changes observed across two samples of
26 See HANSEN, supra note 24; Walter Van Summers et al., Effects of Noise on Speech
Production: Acoustic and Perceptual Analyses, 84 J. AcousTIc Soc. AM. 917 (1988).
27 See Thomas J. Moore & Zinny S. Bond, Acoustic-Phonetic Changes in Speech Due to
Environmental Stressors: Implications for Speech Recognition in the Cockpit, 4 ANN. SYMPOSIUM
AVIATION PSYCH. 26 (1987). The Moore and Bond study is preliminary at best; only two
subjects were tested.
28 The effects on frequency variability are mixed. See G.R. Griffin & Carl E. Williams,
The Effects of Different Levels of Task Complexity on Three Vocal Measures, 58 AVIATION SPACE
ENVIRONMENTAL MEDICINE 1165 (1987); Hansen, supra note 24.
29 See HANSEN, supra note 24; Williams & Stevens, supra note 24, at 1249.
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speech as more like the pattern found with alcohol-affected speech
than with any other probable cause of impairment. There are, how-
ever, three caveats. First, it is not possible to give any kind of confi-
dence rating to such a classification. There is not enough published
laboratory data on individual differences which would allow the cal-
culation of hit rates and false alarm rates for classifications based on
these acoustic measures. 30 Second, there are some possible physio-
logical effects on speech production which have not yet been ade-
quately studied, such as fatigue, illness and being suddenly
awakened. Any of these might conceivably produce effects similar
to those measured after alcohol consumption. Third, no data have
been gathered in more complex environments involving combina-
tions of these stimuli.
D. SCIENTIFIC CONCLUSION
The ultimate conclusion to be drawn from our data is this:
Analyses of audio tapes of Captain Hazelwood's speech cannot
prove that he was alcohol-impaired at the time of the Exxon Valdez
accident. Our analyses, however, provide objective tests for deter-
mining which of several possible explanations of Captain Hazel-
wood's physical state is the most likely. For example, if phonetic
analyses revealed faster speech and higher fundamental frequency,
we could attribute those changes to increased arousal caused by
stress or anger, rather than intoxication. As it turns out, no such
alternative explanation fits the observed pattern of changes in a sim-
ple way.
Analyses show a pattern of changes consistent with alcohol im-
pairment. Captain Hazelwood's speech around the time of the acci-
dent, compared to his speech thirty-three hours earlier or nine
hours later, is characterized by misarticulations of /r/ and Al,
changes from /s/ to /sh/, final devoicing of /iz/ to /is/, reduced
speaking rate, lower fundamental frequency, increased pitch varia-
bility, and a number of word and syllable revisions. This pattern of
segmental and suprasegmental effects is consistent with the pattern
of alcohol-impaired speech measured in a controlled laboratory en-
vironment. It is not consistent with patterns of speech affected by
fear, anger, noise, acceleration, vibration, or increased mental work-
load. The pattern is partially consistent with speech affected by
stress or sorrow, but these changes were observed on the audio tape
30 For example, it is not possible to offer reliable probabilistic statements such as:
"Hazelwood had this pattern, and 95% of people who exhibit this pattern are intoxi-
cated and only 10% of fatigued speakers show this pattern."
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made one hour before the accident, when Hazelwood would probably
not yet have been experiencing either stress or sorrow. The effects
probably were not caused by mechanical problems affecting tape
speed. Our analyses cannot rule out the possibility that Hazel-
wood's speech was affected in whole or part by fatigue, although
logic and general theories of speech motor control suggest this is a
less likely explanation than alcohol consumption. The question
posed by our analyses, then, is whether this scientific evidence is
admissible in court.
III. THE LEGAL STANDARD FOR ADMITrING NOVEL
SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE
The problem of separating reliable scientific evidence from
quackery is not new. For centuries, courts have wrestled with the
question of whether to admit the testimony of expert witnesses.
Although courts have not always come to the right results,3 ' they
have generally agreed on the procedural rule by which science was
to be measured: the "general acceptance" test announced in Frye v.
United States.32 Within the last ten years, however, the effectiveness
of the Frye test as a screening device for scientific evidence has come
under increasing attack, led by Professor Paul Gianelli's watershed
article.33
A. THE FRYE TEST
The Frye test prohibits the courtroom use of scientific evidence
until it has gained "general acceptance" in relevant scientific fields.
The D.C. Court of Appeals announced the test in a case which ruled
inadmissible the test results from a systolic-pressure measurement
device designed to detect lies. The court stated, without precedent
or citation:
Just when a scientific principle or discovery crosses the line between
31 In A Trial of Witches, 6 HOwELL's STATE TRIALS 687, 697 (1665), two women of
Leystoff, County of Suffolk, were accused of bewitching two children. The evidence was
conflicting, so the court sought the opinion of"Dr. Brown of Norwich, a person of great
knowledge" concerning witchcraft. Dr. Brown was clearly of the opinion that the victims
had been bewitched, and explained the procedure whereby the devil excited victims'
humours through pins inserted by witches. The fact that the form of bewitchment ap-
peared to be natural swooning fits he attributed to the villainous "subtilty [sic] of the
devil." His testimony was believed, and the witches were convicted and executed.
32 293 F. 1013, 1014 (D.C.Cir. 1923).
33 Paul C. Gianelli, The Admissibility of Novel Scientific Evidence: Frye v. United States, a
Half-Century Later, 80 COLUM. L. REV. 1197 (1980). That his article has led the trend
away from Frye is somewhat ironic, as Gianelli intended to criticize most of the devia-
tions from the Frye test and urge that we preserve the spirit of Frye by developing a more
workable version of that test. See id. at 1250.
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the experimental and demonstrable stages is difficult to define. Some-
where in this twilight zone the evidential force of the principle must be
recognized, and while courts will go a long way in admitting expert
testimony deduced from a well-recognized scientific principle or dis-
covery, the thing from which the deduction is made must be suffi-
ciently established to have gained general acceptance in the particular
field in which it belongs.3 4
This vague language probably was intended only to justify the
exclusion of "lie detector" test results. Its negative tone expresses
the presumption that scientific evidence will be excluded rather than
admitted. This sets the Frye test at odds with the most fundamental
principle of evidence - that all facts having rational probative value
are presumed admissible.3 5 Nevertheless, this language was widely
adopted by courts as a general principle of exclusion, and is still the
controlling law in some jurisdictions.3 6 Courts have justified the
adoption of a restrictive rule in part because of the fear that jurors
are "easily overawed by conclusions voiced in court by articulate ex-
perts with impressive credentials." 3
7
The major weakness of the Frye test is that it fails to clearly dis-
tinguish between novel scientific evidence and reliable scientific evi-
dence. The general acceptance test arises from a fear of science,
3 8
and therefore tends to exclude all new scientific evidence, whether
or not it is reliable. Courts and commentators, in recognition of this
problem, have increasingly criticized the Fye test on three grounds:
it is bad science, it is bad law, and it is premised on bad
psychology.3 9
1. Frye is Bad Science
The Frye test was supposed to help judges distinguish scientifi-
cally reliable evidence from nonsense. The assumption that general
acceptance of a procedure is synonymous with scientific accuracy,
however, is dubious. This is especially true if courts rely on other
judicial opinions to determine general acceptance. Testing proce-
34 Frye, 293 F.2d at 1014.
35 See I JOHN H. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAw § 10 (Peter Tillers
rev. ed. 1983).
36 E.g., United States v. Shorter, 809 F.2d 54, 60 (D.C. Cir. 1987). See CHARLES T.
MCCORMICK, MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE 606 (Edward W. Cleary ed., 3d ed. 1984); Jo-
seph G. Petrosinelli, Comment, The Admissibility of DNA Typing: A New Methodology, 79
GEo. L.J. 313, 323 (1990); Steven M. Egesdal, Note, The Frye Doctrine and Relevancy Ap-
proach Controversy: An Empirical Evaluation, 74 GEO. L.J. 1769, 1769 (1986).
37 ANDRE A. MOENSSENS ET AL., SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE IN CRIMINAL CASES 6 (3d ed.
1986).
38 See J. Alexander Tanford & Sarah Tanford, Better Trials Through Science: A Defense of
Psychologist-Lawyer Collaboration, 66 N.C.L. REV. 741, 741 (1988).
39 See MCCORMICK, supra note 36, at 606-08; MOENSSENs et al., supra note 37, at 6-13.
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dures can be in widespread use in forensic laboratories, achieving
the appearance of general acceptance, yet never be scientifically reli-
able. Two good examples are the once-popular paraffin test,
thought to determine if a suspect had recently fired a gun,40 and
chirography (handwriting identification). 41 Both have been rou-
tinely admitted by courts as generally accepted procedures; neither
has a valid scientific basis.
The converse is also true: some scientifically reliable testing
procedures have not yet found general acceptance. Frye thus pro-
duces an inevitable "cultural lag" problem.42 Time must pass in or-
der for a new procedure to gain general acceptance, even after the
procedure has become scientifically reliable. All new techniques
must go through a probationary period, wherein the tests are pro-
ducing scientifically reliable results, but trials are conducted without
them.43 This delay until a procedure becomes generally accepted
can be considerable, especially if a new scientific advance is per-
ceived as threatening or too radical (and therefore unacceptable) by
established, older scientists in the field.44
2. Frye is Bad Law
The Frye test is also bad law. Its terms are vague and ambigu-
ous, and judges have difficulty applying it to novel scientific
evidence. 45
In order to apply the Frye doctrine, a court must first identify
the appropriate scientific field. New scientific evidence, however,
may not be easily classifiable into a traditional field, or may overlap
several fields. 46 How the court interprets the term "field" may
therefore be dispositive. If the court defines the field broadly, it vir-
tually assures that many scientists in that broad field will not have
40 See Gianelli, supra note 33, at 1224-25; PeterJ. Neufeld & Neville Colman, When
Science Takes the Witness Stand, 262 Sc. AM. 46, 49 (May 1990).
41 See D. Michael Risinger et al., Exorcism of Ignorance as a Proxy for Rational Knowledge:
the Lessons of Handwriting Identification "Expertise", 137 U. PA. L. REv. 731 (1989).
42 Constantine J. Maletskos and Stephen J. Spielman, Introduction of New Scientific
Methods in Court, in LAw ENFORCEMENT SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY 957, 958 (S.A. Yefsky
ed. 1967).
43 See Gianelli, supra note 33, at 1223.
44 See THOMAS S. KUHN, THE STRUCTURE OF SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTION 6-8 (2d ed.
1970); MOENSSEN et al., supra note 37, at 6-7.
45 If a testing procedure has been around a long time and still not gained general
acceptance (e.g., the polygraph), the Frye test is indeed one measure of the scientific
unreliability of the test. If the testing procedure is new, its lack of general acceptance
may be due to either unreliability or novelty. In this case, the methodology has been in
general use in speech science for over forty years; only the particular application is new.
46 See Petrosinelli, supra note 36, at 319.
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heard of a new procedure. For example, People v. King4 7 involved
the admissibility of spectrogram (voiceprint) evidence. The judge
defined the relevant field as anatomy, physiology, physics, psychol-
ogy and linguistics.48 The test results were excluded when the pro-
ponent could not prove general acceptance in all these disparate
disciplines.
There is also danger in defining the field too narrowly. In the
case of a dispute within a discipline, those who dissent from the con-
ventional wisdom may form their own subfield, within which un-
tested or unreliable evidence is generally accepted. For example,
People v. Williams49 involved the admissibility of a controversial Nal-
line test for detecting narcotic use. The court defined the relevant
field as "those who would be expected to be familiar with its use."
The test results were therefore easily admitted, although the evi-
dence showed that the medical profession generally had never
heard of this supposed test.50
Once the field has been defined, the court must decide if a test-
ing procedure has been generally accepted. This language is obvi-
ously ambiguous. How many scientists must agree? How
unanimous must the agreement be? What is the effect of the oppo-
nent's producing "experts" who dispute acceptance? Is any paid
consultant's opposing testimony enough to disprove general accept-
ance? These issues have never been answered by courts interpret-
ing the Frye test.51
Even if general acceptance were more clearly defined, the Frye
test does not set forth any specific foundation requirements. In the
first place, it does not place any restrictions on who may be called as
a witness. The general acceptance language could be interpreted as
requiring a disinterested foundation witness other than a scientist
who helped create the new technique.52 Such a disinterested wit-
ness, however, is unlikely to know enough about the new technique
to answer questions (especially on cross-examination) about the de-
tails of its operation. Witnesses who know most about the details of
a particular test, however, are often not scientists, but technicians or
"examiners" who are trained to use a piece of testing equipment,
but who are unable to provide necessary information to determine
47 266 Cal. App. 2d 437, 72 Cal. Rptr. 478 (1968).
48 Id. at 456, 72 Cal. Rptr. at 490.
49 164 Cal. App. 2d Supp. 858, 331 P.2d 251 (Cal. App. Dep't Super. Ct. 1958).
50 Id. at 860-61, 331 P.2d at 253-54.
51 See Gianelli, supra note 33, at 1215-16.
52 E.g., People v. Tobey, 401 Mich. 141, 145-46, 257 N.W.2d 537, 539 (1977) (re-
jecting voiceprint evidence because expert witness built career on voiceprint and was
not disinterested).
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its underlying scientific reliability.53
It is also unclear whether a single witness can establish general
acceptance. A few courts have held that more than one expert is
required, 54 although this conflicts with the general evidence princi-
ple that a foundation may be laid by a single person unless a rule
clearly requires corroboration.
Is general acceptance a matter merely of expert opinion, or is
some minimal level of conditional fact required? For example, may
a procedure ever be said to be generally accepted as scientifically
valid based on a single validating study? The Frye test seems to as-
sume that additional validating studies will be done over time -
otherwise there is no reason to require a probationary period for
new scientific techniques. Some courts, however, have admitted
voiceprint evidence on the basis of a single study from Michigan
State University.55 If additional validating studies are required, how
many are required? Must they be done by a second research team?
Is publication in a peer-reviewed professional journal sufficient? Is
any particular degree of significance required in the validating stud-
ies? Must the studies show that a test is 98% reliable? 90%? 75%?
Frye refers to a requirement that some "thing" have gained gen-
eral acceptance. 56 It does not explain what that thing is. Although
it seems obvious that the court was referring to the specific testing
procedure at issue - use of a device that measured systolic blood
pressure changes to detect deception - in the same paragraph, the
Frye court refers to scientific principles, discoveries, and deductions.
It leaves open the issue of whether general acceptance must be
proved for the underlying scientific theory, 57 the technology,58 the
procedure and technique,59 the particular instrument used,60 or
some combination. This can make a substantial difference, because
novel scientific evidence may involve a new theory, a new applica-
53 See Gianelli, supra note 33, at 1214-15; MOENSSENS et al., supra note 37, at 9.
54 E.g., People v. Kelly, 17 Cal. 3d 24, 37, 549 P.2d 1240, 1248, 130 Cal. Rptr. 144,
157 (1976) (rejecting voiceprint evidence and doubting whether single witness can ever
satisfy foundation).
55 See Gianelli, supra note 33, at 1213.
56 Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013, 1014 (D.C. Cir. 1923).
57 See, e.g., United States v. Addison, 498 F.2d 741, 743 (D.C. Cir. 1974) (theory must
be generally accepted).
58 See, e.g., United States v. Stifel, 433 F.2d 431, 438 (6th Cir. 1970) (state of technol-
ogy - neutron activation analysis).
59 See eg., People v. Law, 40 Cal. App. 3d 69, 84, 114 Cal. Rptr. 708, 718 (1974)
(reliability of procedure - voiceprint); Reed v. State, 283 Md. 374, 385, 391 A.2d 364,
370-71 (1978) (reliability of technique or process - voiceprint).
60 See Commonwealth v. Fatalo, 346 Mass. 266, 269, 191 N.E.2d 479, 481 (1963)
(scientific acceptance of instrument - polygraph).
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tion of established theory, an improved procedure, or the use of a
new instrument. 61
Finally, Frye is bad law because it requires judges to make deci-
sions for which they are ill-equipped. Judges generally are illiterate
in science, untrained in statistics, and operate in a legal culture that
is non-scientific (if not actively hostile to science). 62 Judges are
therefore poorly equipped to distinguish generally reliable from un-
reliable methods. Nor are they likely to get any help from lawyers,
who are similarly untrained in science and have difficulty accessing
scientific debates in science journals. 63
3. Frye Is Premised on Bad Psychology
One underlying premise of the Frye test is that jurors will be
easily awed by expert testimony. Gianelli asserts that "an aura of
scientific infallibility may shroud the evidence and thus lead the jury
to accept it without critical scrutiny." 64 Professor Laurence Tribe
makes the same argument about statistical evidence. 65 In U.S. v. Ad-
dison, the D.C. Court of Appeals asserts that scientific evidence may
"assume a posture of mystic infallibility in the eyes of a jury of
laymen." 66
This assertion about human behavior is dubious. Social psy-
chologists have demonstrated that people generally undervalue scien-
tific data, misunderstand and under-utilize statistics, rely on
anecdotes and emotion rather than empirical scientific evidence
when making important decisions, and persistently hold beliefs con-
trary to scientific logic and mathematics. 67 Some studies focusing
specifically on juries have found that expert witnesses have no sig-
61 See Gianelli, supra note 33, at 1212.
62 J. Alexander Tanford, The Limits of a Scientific Jurisprudence: the Supreme Court and
Psychology, 66 IND. L.J. 137, 154-55 (1990).
63 See Neufeld & Colman, supra note 40, at 49.
64 Gianelli, supra note 33, at 1237.
65 Laurence H. Tribe, Trial by Mathematics: Precision and Ritual in the Legal Process, 84
HARV. L. REV. 1329, 1355 (1971).
66 498 F.2d 741,744 (D.C. Cir. 1974). See also State v. Carlson, 267 N.W.2d 170, 176
(Minn. 1978).
67 See RICHARD E. NISBETr & LEE Ross, HUMAN INFERENCE: STRATEGIES AND SHORT-
COMINGS OF SOCIALJUDGMENT 55-56 (1980); Michael Saks & Robert Kidd, Human Infor-
mation Processing and Adjudication: Trial by Heuristics, 15 LAw & Soc'v REV. 123, 127-31,
149 (1981); William C. Thompson & Edward L. Schumann, Interpretation of Statistical Evi-
dence in Criminal Trials: The Prosecutor's Fallacy and the Defense Attorney's Fallacy, 11 LAW &
HUM. BEHAV. 167 (1987); William C. Thompson, Are Juries Competent to Evaluate Statistical
Evidence, LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS., Autumn 1989, at 9, 33 (most subjects give less weight
to statistical evidence than it deserves).
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nificant impact on verdicts. 68
B. ALTERNATIVE LEGAL STANDARDS
In response to the weaknesses of the Frye test, commentators
have suggested that it be replaced with either of two alternatives: A
modified Frye test or a relevancy test.69
1. Modified Frye Tests
One proposal would modify the "general acceptance" part of
the Frye test. Commentators have suggested the substitution of
"substantial" or "reasonable" acceptance. 70 This would probably
have the effect of admitting more scientific evidence, but would still
be ambiguous and difficult to apply. It also would be unlikely to
more effectively distinguish reliable from unreliable new techniques.
A second proposal would modify the definition of "field." In
People v. Williams,7' the court stated that it would accept scientific
evidence unknown in a general scientific field, if it were accepted as
reliable within a narrow specialtym-those who would be expected to
be familiar with its use. This variation would naturally tend to admit
more novel scientific evidence, but it fails to address the problem
that even within a specialty field, acceptance is not the same thing as
reliability.
The third proposal is to modify Frye's requirement that the
technique be generally accepted. It would require only that the sci-
entific principles underlying a new testing procedure be generally
accepted. New testing procedures designed to explore a particular
problem using generally accepted principles and existing equipment
would be admissible, even if the particular application were new.72
68 E.g., Martha A. Myers, Rule Departures and Making Law: Juries and Their Verdicts, 13
LAW & Soc'y REV. 751, 762 (1979).
69 A third alternative has also been suggested: delegating the decision on reliability
to independent bodies of science advisors. Some have suggested the creation of a sci-
ence court, others the use of independent bodies of experts hired to advise courts on
validity of scientific techniques. See Gianelli, supra note 33, at 1231-32; MCCORMICK,
supra note 36, at 608 n.27. The idea was incompatible with the adversary system, and
went nowhere. See David L. Bazelon, Coping with Technology Through the Legal Process, 62
CORNELL L. REV. 817, 826-28 (1977).
70 JAMES R. RICHARDSON, MODERN SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE 24 (2d ed. 1974) (substantial
acceptance); Howard A. Latin et al., Remote Sensing Evidence and Environmental Law, 64
CAL. L. REV. 1300, 1380 (1976) (reasonable acceptance); Lucinda E. Minton, Note, Ex-
pert Testimony Based on Novel Scientific Techniques: Admissibility Under the Federal Rules of Evi-
dence, 48 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 774, 787 (1980) (preponderance of experts accept).
71 331 P.2d 251 (1958).
72 Ibn-Tamas v. United States, 407 A.2d 626, 638 (D.C. 1979); Coppolino v. State,
223 So. 2d 68 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1968), appeal dismissed, 234 So. 2d 120 (Fla. 1969), cert.
denied, 399 U.S. 927 (1970). Gianelli argues that the Coppolino test is essentially the
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2. Relevancy Tests
The trend, however, is to reject Frye rather than to attempt to
modify it. As early as 1954, leading scholars were calling for the
substitution of a basic relevancy test. Any relevant scientific evi-
dence supported by a qualified expert should be presumptively ad-
missible.73 Neither the evidence's novelty nor its lack of general
acceptance are dispositive, for neither criterion makes scientific evi-
dence relevant.74 The primary check against unreliable or pseudo-
scientific evidence is the rule permitting the opponent to contradict
the expert's testimony by introducing passages from leading text-
books in the field written by reliable authorities. 75
Scholars who advocate the use of a basic relevancy test have
suggested five criteria which scientific evidence sought to be admit-
ted should meet. First, the evidence must be introduced through a
properly qualified expert. Second, the subject matter must be one
on which expert testimony will assist the jury. Third, all equipment
involved in generating the evidence must be shown to be in good
working order. Fourth, the evidence must be relevant under basic
relevancy rules. Fifth, the probative value of the evidence must be
"weighed" against its potential prejudicial effect. Each of these cri-
teria will be discussed in turn.
a. Introduction by an Expert Witness
The first admissibility requirement under a relevancy approach
is that scientific evidence must be introduced through a properly qualified ex-
pert. All novel scientific evidence must be sponsored by an expert
witness who can explain both the theoretical and practical reliability
of the new testing procedure. Although the usual rule is that either
education or experience will qualify a person as an expert, 76 in the
Hazelwood case a fully-educated scientist is probably required.
Mere experience with a new forensic technique is inadequate to ex-
plain the theoretical validity of a procedure, so a technician proba-
bly cannot lay the necessary foundation. 77
same thing as McCormick's relevancy test. Gianelli, supra note 33, at 1233-35. See text
accompanying notes 73-91, infra.
73 1 CHARLES T. McCORMICK, EVIDENCE 363-64 (1954).
74 United States v. Stifel, 433 F.2d 431, 438 (6th Cir. 1970) (newness and lack of
absolute certainty affect weight, not admissibility: "Every useful new development must
have its first day in court.").
75 See FED. R. EvID. 803(18).
76 E.g., FED. R. EVID. 702.
77 See Gianelli, supra note 33, at 1214-15; MOENSSENS et al., supra note 37, at 9-10.
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b. Expert Testimony Must Assist the Jury
The second requirement is that the subject matter must be one in
which expert testimony will assist the jury. Expert testimony generally is
permitted only in situations in which the jury could use some help.
For example, experts with breathalyzers and blood test results will
be of real assistance to a jury in determining a person's blood-alco-
hol content, but traffic safety experts are probably not needed to
help ajury determine if high-speed drunk driving is dangerous. The
difference is whether the jury is presumed to be competent to draw
their own conclusions based on observations.
There are three possible situations in which introduction of ex-
pert testimony might be sought. First, the data upon which conclu-
sions are to be drawn may be beyond the jurors' perceptions, so that
jurors are incapable of drawing any conclusions about the subject,
e.g., quantum mechanics or brain surgery. In this case, experts will
always be permitted. Second, the data may consist of common sub-
jective evaluations based on perceptions completely within common
knowledge, e.g., whether a concrete block falls to the ground when
dropped off a scaffold. No physicist is necessary to explain gravity.
In this situation, experts are superfluous. Third, the subject may be
somewhere in between. The data may be partially hidden, or it may
be an area in which lay and expert witnesses use quite different
methods for reaching similar kinds of conclusions, e.g., whether fail-
ure to water a lawn during a drought caused grass to die.
Under traditional principles of evidence law, still followed in a
few states, scientific evidence was presumed inadmissible. Expert
testimony was permitted only in the first situation - when the mat-
ter at issue was completely beyond the understanding and common
experience of the average juror.78 Thus, scientific evidence was ex-
cluded if the jurors and the expert were similarly qualified to draw
conclusions. The rule did not recognize the possibility that jurors
might draw better conclusions with the aid of experts.
The modem version of the rule79 reflects the contemporary
view of presumptive admissibility. It states that scientific evidence is
admissible if it will "assist" the jury in understanding the evidence
or in drawing conclusions. Under this version, evidence should be
admitted ifjurors and experts can both draw reliable conclusions. In-
deed, it is under this modem view that testimony on field sobriety
78 E.g., State v. Maudlin, 416 N.E.2d 477 (Ind. Ct. App. 1981). See MCCORMICK, supra
note 36, at 33.
79 E.g., FED. R. EVID. 702.
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tests is admitted.80
c. Equipment in Good Working Order
The third requirement is that all equipment involved in generating
scientific evidence be shown to be in good working order. Inherent in the
creation of scientific evidence is reliance on machinery, technology,
and laboratory equipment. The reliability of an ultimate scientific
conclusion may depend on factors the scientist takes for granted -
that ordinary pieces of apparatus were in good working order and
were operated by qualified persons. The law requires proof that in-
struments and equipment, such as microphones, tape recorders, and
X-ray machines, were in good working order and were properly op-
erated during the creation of any particular piece of scientific evi-
dence. It also requires that human beings be accounted for. If an
expert relies on lab technicians or graduate students, they must be
shown to be reliable and properly trained. Some jurisdictions also
require proof that reliance on these supporting procedures be con-
sidered reasonable by experts in the field.8'
d. Scientific Reliability (Relevance)
The fourth requirement is that scientific evidence must be relevant
under basic relevancy rules, such as Federal Rules of Evidence (FRE)
401-402. Under FRE 401, evidence is relevant whenever it helps
the jury determine the facts in issue to any extent. Gianelli argues
that scientific evidence will help the jury when it can be shown to be
reasonably reliable under a three part test: 1) The underlying princi-
ples must be considered valid by the scientific community. The test
must be based on conventional scientific theory. 2) The technique
applying the principle must be scientifically reliable. Has basic re-
search been conducted that demonstrates that the procedure works
as predicted, and generally produces statistically significant results?
3) The technique must have been applied properly on the occasion
of the particular test.8 2 Novelty and lack of general acceptance do
not negate reliability, and thus go to the weight rather than the ad-
missibility of the evidence.8 3
80 See People v. Randolph, 213 Cal. App. 3d Supp. 1, 262 Cal. Rptr. 378 (1989);
People v. Krueger, 99 Il1. App. 2d 431, 437-38, 241 N.E.2d 707, 712 (1968). Typical
field sobriety tests are descibed in Pennsylvania v. Muniz, 110 S. Ct. 2638, 2641 n.l
(1990).
81 E.g., FED. R. EVID. 703.
82 Gianelli, supra note 33, at 1201-02. See also Neufeld & Colman, supra note 40, at 48
(three-part test is sensible from scientific point of view).
83 Degree of acceptance, including testimony by opposing experts, goes to weight,
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This relevancy test creates a standard of presumptive admissi-
bility. Ajudge "should exclude an expert opinion only if it is 'funda-
mentally unsupported' and 'would not actually assist the jury in
arriving at an intelligent and sound verdict.' 184 As a rule, "it is bet-
ter to admit relevant scientific evidence in the same manner as other
expert testimony and allow its weight to be attacked by cross-exami-
nation and refutation."' 5 Thus, any relevant conclusions supported
by even a single qualified expert witness should be received unless
there are distinct reasons for excluding them.86
e. Balancing Probative Value Against Prejudicial Effect
The fifth requirement is that the probative value of the scientific evi-
dence must be "weighed" against its potential prejudicial effect. 87 Under the
federal rule, the evidence will be admitted unless its probative value
is substantially outweighed by the danger that it will mislead the
jury.8 8 If the evidence helps to prove one of the central disputed
issues in a case, it will almost always be admissible.89 The mere fact
that evidence is scientific in nature does not make it prejudicial.
Courts have generally articulated only one major danger: sci-
entific evidence may mislead a jury into making a factual error be-
cause of a supposed aura of scientific infallibility. 90 Social
not admissibility. Jenkins v. State, 156 Ga. App. 387, 388, 274 S.E.2d 618, 619 (1980);
Reed v. State, 283 Md. 374, 386-87; 391 A.2d 364, 370-71 (1978).
84 Christophersen v. Allied Signal Corp., 902 F.2d 362, 364-65 (5th Cir. 1990)(em-
phasis added)(quoting Viterbo v. Dow Chemical Co., 826 F.2d 420,422 (5th Cir. 1987)).
But see Gianelli, supra note 33, at 1245-50 (proposing a presumption of inadmissibility
and a requirement that the state prove reliability beyond a reasonable doubt).
85 United States v. Baller, 519 F.2d 463, 466 (4th Cir. 1975).
86 Cf Gianelli, supra note 33, at 1236, 1243 (criticizing test for this reason). McCor-
mick argues that one expert is not enough. He would require some corroboration, such
as publication in a peer-reviewed journal, and that scientists rather than technicians
serve as expert witnesses. MCCORMICK, supra note 36, at 609.
87 See J. Alexander Tanford, A Political-Choice Approach to Limiting Preudicial Evidence,
64 IND. LJ. 831, 859-71 (1989) (criticizing balancing metaphor and suggesting that
courts are really making choices).
88 See Gianelli, supra note 33, at 1230. FED. R. EvID. 403 also provides for the exclu-
sion of relevant evidence that will cause undue prejudice, confusion of the issues, and
undue waste of time. Scientific evidence does not substantially implicate any of these.
Unfair prejudice refers to the arousing of emotions in jurors, when those emotions are
not inherent in the nature of the case. Tanford, supra note 87, at 843. Confusion of the
issues generally refers to confusion about the legal issues. If evidence tends to cause
jurors to apply an erroneous understanding of the law, it is prejudicial. Id. at 847-48.
Undue waste of time usually means that undue time would be spent on tangential issues,
and does not apply to evidence that casts light on the central issues. Id. at 852-54.
89 See Tanford, supra note 87, at 863-64 (if evidence has any real probative value,
courts admit it).
90 See Gianelli, supra note 33, at 1237. If techniques are demonstrable in the court-
room and involve principles and procedures understandable to the lay jury, there is little
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psychologists, however, suggest that the risk of undue influence is
minimal - certainly far short of the "substantially outweighs" stan-
dard of Rule 403. The better test would find substantial danger of
misleading the jury only when "an exaggerated popular opinion of
the accuracy of a particular technique makes its use ... likely to
mislead the jury."' '
A supposedly different version of the relevancy test was sug-
gested in United States v. Downing.92 The Downing test bases the ad-
missibility of scientific evidence on Rule 702 rather than Rules 401-
403.9 3 It assumes that the use of the word "assist" in Rule 702
means more than mere relevancy. The Downing court suggested a
balancing analysis that asks: 1) How reliable is the process or tech-
nique used in generating the evidence? 2) Will it overwhelm, con-
fuse or mislead the jury? and 3) How strong is the connection
between the test results and the factual dispute? This test seems
virtually indistinguishable from the basic relevancy test.
A few appellate courts have endorsed a more informal, ad hoc
determination of reliability.94 These courts apparently focus pri-
marily on the third criteria of the relevancy test: was the test prop-
erly conducted in the particular case? This is clearly a question of
fact for the trial judge. The problem with this approach is that it
grants to thousands of trial judges the power to make individual rul-
ings on the validity of scientific theories and techniques. Trial
judges, however, will not all be equally scientifically literate, and
their rulings are likely to vary. Yet, the very essence of science is its
universality.95 It does not vary from county to county and case to
case, so a rule of law permitting such results is unsound.96
concern with experts having undue influence. However, when the nature of the analysis
is esoteric or invisible, e.g., DNA-typing that depends on knowledge of molecular biol-
ogy, chemistry, genetics and statistics, a stronger showing of probative value could be
required. See William C. Thompson & Simon Ford, DNA Typing: Acceptance and Weight of
the New Genetic Identification Tests, 75 VA. L. REV. 45, 52 (1989).
91 United States v. Baller, 519 F.2d 463, 466 (4th Cir. 1975). See Andrew E. Taslitz,
Does the Cold Nose Know? The Unscientific Myth of the Dog Scent Line-up, 42 HASTINGs LJ. 15,
23-28, 42-50 (1990) (popular belief in infallibility of bloodhounds' powers of scent far
exceeds scientific fact).
92 735 F.2d 1224 (3d Cir 1985).
93 FED. R. EvID.- 702 provides: "If scientific.., knowledge will assist the trier of fact
to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, [an] expert ... may testify
thereto in the form of an opinion or otherwise."
94 See State v. Hall, 297 N.W.2d 80 (Iowa 1980); United States v. Stifel, 433 F.2d 431,
437-41 (6th Cir. 1970).
95 ROBERT K. MERTON, THE SOCIOLOGY OF SCIENCE 270-73 (Norman W. Storer ed.,
1973).
96 See Gianelli, supra note 33, at 1222-23.
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IV. Is ACOUSTIC-PHONETIC EVIDENCE ADMISSIBLE IN THE EXXON
VALDEZ CASE?
A. ADMISSIBILITY UNDER THE FRYE TEST
We concede at the outset that the results of our analyses of
Captain Hazelwood's speech are probably not admissible under the
Frye test. Although our evidence derives from generally accepted
scientific theory, and uses standard techniques of speech analysis,
the particular application to alcohol has not yet achieved general
acceptance. Despite all the problems of interpreting the meaning of
the old Frye test, it is doubtful that the evidence would be admitted
in any jurisdiction that strictly follows the old rule, which favors
exclusion.
It is also unlikely that our evidence would be admissible under
two of the modified Frye tests. The application probably has not yet
gained "substantial" acceptance. It is too new for many speech
scientists to have heard of and thought about it. Articles describing
the procedure are just now appearing in peer-reviewed scientific
journals. Nor has a subspecialty emerged that uses this novel appli-
cation to measure the effects of alcohol on speech, the existence of
which would justify using the "narrow field" test.
This evidence might, however, be admissible under the third
Frye modification, which requires a new forensic application to be
derived from accepted techniques, based on generally accepted un-
derlying scientific principles and using generally accepted labora-
tory equipment. To lay a foundation under this Frye variation, the
proponents must show that the underlying scientific theory is con-
sidered valid (generally accepted) by the scientific community, and
that the techniques and equipment used are known to be reliable
and are in widespread use (generally accepted) in the scientific com-
munity. These are essentially the same requirements contained in
part four of the relevancy test, and will be considered below.
B. ADMISSIBILITY UNDER A RELEVANCY TEST
Whether evidence of acoustic analyses of Captain Hazelwood's
speech using audio tapes from the Exxon Valdez should be admissible
under the modem relevancy test depends on the answers to five
questions: 1) Is a properly qualified expert witness available who
can explain the theoretical and practical reliability of the tests?
2) Is the subject-matter one on which expert testimony will assist
the jury in understanding the evidence and drawing accurate con-
clusions? 8) Were all pieces of equipment used in the test in good
working order, and all technical personnel adequately trained?
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4) Are the underlying theories reliable, are the techniques valid,
and were the proper procedures followed? 5) Is there an exagger-
ated popular opinion of the accuracy of the technique so that its use
is likely to mislead the jury?
1. Introduction by an Expert Witness
Properly qualified experts in speech science must be available
to sponsor the evidence. Speech science is a diverse field that draws
upon linguistics, psychology, clinical speech and hearing science,
physiology, physics and electrical engineering.9 7 The tie that binds
the field together is the Acoustical Society of America, which in-
cludes a speech communication section. A person with a graduate
degree in one of the underlying disciplines, with training or experi-
ence focusing on speech science, affiliated with a university- or in-
dustry-sponsored speech laboratory, who is a member of the ASA,
and who is familiar with the literature on alcohol and speech,98
ought to qualify as an appropriate witness.
Because the evidence in the Hazelwood case concerns the ef-
fects of alcohol on speech, some experience in the field of alcohol
research also is desirable. Even among speech scientists, however,
few will have the necessary expertise. The effects of alcohol on
speech production is tangential to the main body of acoustic-pho-
netic research.99 Few speech scientists have personally conducted
research in the area because the research protocols' 00 are more
complicated than for usual speech research, and because no obvious
theoretical issues are involved. However, at least a few qualified ex-
perts are available. 10
97 See generally BORDEN & HARRIS, supra note 9 (basic textbook giving overview of
speech science). See also FLANAGAN, supra note 18 (textbook on engineering and physics
of speech); DENNIS B. FRY, THE PHYSICS OF SPEECH (1979) (textbook in speech acous-
tics); PHILIP LIEBERMAN & SHEILA E. BLUMSTEIN, SPEECH PHYSIOLOGY, SPEECH PERCEP-
TION, AND ACOUSTIC PHONETICS (1988) (textbook on physiology and psychology of
speech).
98 See, e.g., Johnson et al., supra note 1, at 3-11 (summarizing relevant literature).
99 See, e.g., BORDEN & HARRIS, supra note 9, at 291-302 (detailed index contains no
entries relating to research on the effects of alcohol); HARRY HOLLIEN, THE ACOUSTICS
OF CRIME ix-xiv (1990) (table of contents of recent textbook on acoustics makes no refer-
ence to alcohol effects).
100 Such as obtaining approval from human subject committees.
101 E.g., the second and third authors of this paper. Dr. Pisoni has a Ph.D. in Cogni-
tive Psychology, is a Professor of Psychology and Cognitive Science at Indiana Univer-
sity and currently the Director of its Speech Research Laboratory, has personally
conducted research on the effects of alcohol on speech, e.g., Pisoni & Martin, supra note
1, and is familiar with the literature. Johnson et al., supra note 1, at 216-220. Dr. John-
son has a Ph.D. in Linguistics from Ohio State University, is currently a post-doctoral
fellow in the Phonetics Laboratory of the Department of Linguistics at U.C.L.A, has
[Vol. 82
EXXON VALDEZ ACOUSTIC ANALYSIS
2. Expert Testimony Will Assist the Jury
If the results of acoustic analyses of Captain Hazelwood's
speech are to be admissible, the evidence must assist the jury in de-
termining whether Hazelwood was intoxicated. People draw con-
clusions about intoxication all the time, 10 2 so this is not a situation
in which experts are required because the data necessary to draw
reliable conclusions are inaccessible to the average person. Neither
is this a topic considered so completely within common knowledge
that experts are never permitted. Courts routinely admit other
forms of expert testimony concerning alcohol impairment, such as
the results of breathalyzer and blood tests 10 3 and field sobriety
tests. 10 4 Therefore, our acoustic-phonetic analyses should be evalu-
ated under the middle category in which particular experts will be
allowed if their testimony will assist the jury in drawing accurate
conclusions.
Empirical research suggests that jurors often can tell whether a
speaker is intoxicated. Many phonetic changes that accompany al-
cohol impairment, such as word substitutions and revisions, are eas-
ily detected by naive listeners. Pisoni and Martin found that both
college students and Indiana State Troopers could identify intoxi-
cated (0.10% BAL) talkers with about 80% accuracy when they di-
rectly compared intoxicated to sober speech samples.10 5 Even when
a speech sample was presented in isolation, Martin and Yuchtman
found that naive listeners were able to identify intoxicated speakers
based on listening with about 66% accuracy. Although these detec-
tion rates are better than chance, they also show that jurors can
make mistakes. Can expert testimony by speech scientists assist the
jury in minimizing these mistakes? The issue is not whether experts
can more accurately determine whether a speaker has been drinking,
but whether they can provide additional data that will assist the
jury's common sense determination.
In the Exxon Valdez case, the information that can be provided
by experts is nonredundant. Although speech scientists' observa-
tions of gross phonetic changes overlap the aural information jurors
personally conducted research on the effects of alcohol on speech, and is familiar with
the literature. Id.
102 E.g., New v. State, 254 Ind. 307, 259 N.E.2d 696 (1970) (lay people commonly
make conclusions about intoxication).
103 E.g., Shuman v. State, 489 N.E.2d 126 (Ind. Ct. App. 1986) (blood serum tests for
intoxication admissible); Ballou v. Henri Studios, 656 F.2d 1147 (5th Cir 1981) (breath
tests admissible).
104 See People v. Randolph, 213 Cal. App. 3d Supp. 1, 262 Cal. Rptr. 378 (1989);
People v. Krueger, 99 Ill. App. 2d 431, 241 N.E.2d 707 (1968).
105 Pisoni & Martin, supra note 1.
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rely on, their instrumental measurements provide data otherwise
unavailable to jurors - objective, unbiased quantitative measure-
ments of segmental and suprasegmental effects, such as pitch, dura-
tion, and amplitude.10 6 Like breathalyzer measurements, expert
evidence based on acoustic-phonetic analyses of speech would pro-
vide unbiased data to supplement jurors' intuitions. This would as-
sist, rather than hinder, the jury in reaching a more accurate
conclusion about whether a speaker was intoxicated.
3. Equipment in Good Working Order
To satisfy the third part of the foundation for scientific evi-
dence, all equipment involved in acoustic analyses of speech sam-
ples must have been in proper working order at all times in
question. This requirement would be an essential part of speech
science research1 07 even if it were not part of the legal foundation.
One measure of the true scientific nature of tests and experiments is
the degree of care taken to make sure all the equipment was in good
working order and operated properly by trained technicians.
Because the analysis procedures used on the Exxon Valdez tapes
involved a comparison across speech samples, rather than absolute
detection of impairment, the only real requirement for the record-
ings is that the same recording and playback equipment was used
for both samples in the comparison. Most imperfections in equip-
ment would appear on both the control and test recordings and
would not affect analysis. For example, if a tape recorder runs
slightly slowly, the resulting tapes when played back will show in-
creased average pitch compared to the person's true pitch. We are
concerned, however, only with relative changes in pitch between
samples, a factor unaffected by the overall change in tape speed.
Concededly, a tape recorder could suffer from wow and flutter
or other erratic speed fluctuations that could affect tape-to-tape
comparisons. The possibility of unusual speed variations in this
case was minimized by verifying that the speaking rate of a presuma-
bly sober Coast Guard radio operator on the same tapes did not
vary significantly. In addition, we analyzed background noise across
tape samples and found that its frequency did not vary significantly.
These two sets of measurements strongly indicate that the equip-
ment was properly functioning to the extent necessary for drawing
reliable conclusions based on tape-to-tape comparisons.
In order to minimize the possibility of error in the laboratory, it
106 See supra Tables 3-6.
107 See BORDEN & HARRIS, supra note 9, at 224-25.
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is common to take multiple measurements using different person-
nel. We followed such a procedure in analyzing the tapes of Captain
Hazelwood's speech. Two well-trained post-graduate researchers
made independent, overlapping measurements. No errors were de-
tected when we compared them. This is standard operating proce-
dure in speech science laboratories around the country.108
4. Scientific Reliability and Relevance
The evidence concerning Captain Hazelwood's possible alcohol
impairment is sufficiently reliable to be relevant under FRE 401 and
402.
a. Theory
The general principles of speech science are considered scien-
tifically valid and are not controversial.10 9 The specific theoretical
assumption underlying our acoustic analyses of Captain Hazel-
wood's speech samples is that alcohol affects motor function which
affects speech control. 110 This, too, seems largely undebateable.
After all, it is one of the major assumptions underlying field sobriety
tests routinely used by law enforcement agencies as preliminary evi-
dence of alcohol impairment. Another indication of the validity of
this theory is the publication in peer-reviewed scientific journals of
three articles describing this research and its theoretical underpin-
nings." 1I No articles have been published that suggest any contrary
view. Indeed, the results are consistent with the findings from over
forty years of basic research on speech acoustics and speech
production. 1 2
b. Validation of Technique
The general techniques of acoustic-phonetics that we employed
are in common use in speech laboratories throughout the country.
Previous research has validated them as reliable methods of measur-
108 See id-, at 223-53 (describing standard acoustic-phonetic research protocols).
109 Speech science generally is described in BORDEN & HARRIS, supra note 9, and
FLANAGAN, supra note 18. Acoustic-phonetic analysis of speech sounds is described in
BORDEN & HARRIS, supra, at 223-53, and by FLANAGAN, supra, at 140-204.
110 See Berry & Pentreath, supra note 7, at 43-72; Johnson et al., supra note 1, at 216-
17; Klingholz et al., supra note 15, at 929-35.
111 See Pisoni & Martin, supra note 1, at 577-78;Johnson et al., supra note 1, at 217-20;
Klingholz et al., supra note 15.
112 See BORDEN & HARRIS, supra note 9, at 131-34, 142-50 (theoretical models of
speech production); Flanagan, supra note 18, at 9-23 (physiology of speech production).
See also id. at 45-58, 78-89, 106-117 (basic description of how speech is produced).
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ing speech effects. 113
Previous controlled studies of subjects other than Captain Ha-
zelwood demonstrate that these techniques can reliably measure
when a person's speech has been affected by alcohol consumption.
Acoustic analyses cannot prove that a person was definitely intoxi-
cated, nor specify the exact blood alcohol level. However, the
Pisoni and Martin study revealed that alcohol affects speech in pre-
dictable ways, producing patterns of measureable effects more con-
sistent with significant alcohol impairment than with any other
known condition that affects speech. 14 The results of the Pisoni
and Martin validating study are further corroborated by other ex-
perimental studies of alcohol-related speech impairments. 1 5
5. Balancing Probative Value Against Prejudicial Effect
Because the scientific evidence concerning Captain Hazel-
wood's speech is reliable, it should be admitted unless some Rule
403 danger substantially outweighs its probative value. Assuming the
evidence is introduced in a case in which the possible intoxication of
Captain Hazelwood is an important issue, its probative value is high.
It is the only evidence of its kind. The duration and frequency mea-
surements are unique because they are the only physical evidence
and the only unbiased evidence bearing on the issue of intoxication.
The only other available evidence consists of the opinions of eyewit-
nesses who worked for Exxon. Nonredundant evidence on a central
issue will almost always be admissible,"16 because it would require
extreme Rule 403 dangers to significantly outweigh high probative
value.
There is no problem here with the usual danger associated with
scientific evidence - misleading the jury into making a factual error
because of an exaggerated popular opinion of the accuracy of a par-
ticular technique. There is little, if any, evidence that the public has
ever heard of acoustic-phonetic analysis of speech.
Are there any other possible FRE 403 dangers? The only other
likely objection to it is that it may constitute an undue waste of time.
This objection is normally unavailing when the evidence goes to the
heart of an issue, as this evidence does. It is unlikely to be consid-
113 Eg., BORDEN & HARRIS, supra note 9, at 224-28, 230-36, 250-53; Flanagan, supra
note 18, at 141-55, 184-86.
114 Pisoni & Martin, supra note 1.
115 See Klingholz et al., supra note 15; Lester & Skousen, supra note 10; Pisoni et al.,
supra note 10; Sobell & Sobell, supra note 8; Sobeli et al., supra note 8; Trojan & Kryspin-
Exner, supra note 10.
116 See Tanford, supra note 87, at 863-70.
608 [Vol. 82
EXXON VALDEZ ACOUSTIC ANALYSIS
ered an undue waste of time to allow a battle of experts on the cen-
tral issue-whether Hazelwood was drunk. In any event, battles
occur mostly when scientific evidence requires considerable subjec-
tive interpretation based on the absence of hard data - psychiatric
diagnosis is the paradigmatic example. Our conclusion that Hazel-
wood's voice showed effects consistent with alcohol consumption is
based in part on objective data (i.e., physical measurements of dura-
tion and fundamental frequency) requiring little interpretation.
Nothing indicates the likelihood of any real debate over the conclu-
sions that we draw. The opposition will most likely take the form of
objections to the methodology employed. That battle will be fought
mostly in front of the judge on the question of admissibility. There-
fore, there is no serious risk of prejudice that can substantially out-
weigh the relevancy of the evidence.
V. CONCLUSIONS
Expert testimony, based on acoustic analyses of audio tapes,
that Captain Hazelwood probably was intoxicated at the time the
Exxon Valdez ran aground should be admitted. Properly qualified ex-
perts are available to sponsor the evidence. The evidence will assist
the jury in determining one of the key facts in issue. The analyses of
the Hazelwood tapes appear to have been conducted properly. The
evidence itself is scientifically reliable. It is based on accepted theo-
ries of speech acoustics and uses standard equipment and technol-
ogy. The accuracy of these techniques has already been
demonstrated in controlled laboratory experiments in which sub-
jects were intoxicated to known blood alcohol levels. Finally, no
particular fact-finding danger is posed by its use. Accordingly, these
analyses should be admissible under the emerging "relevancy test"
for scientific evidence.
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